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Winston Churchill famously described democracy as the worst 
form of government—but for all of the others.  The same holds true of 
judicial elections.  Their merits are often overlooked when alternatives 
are discussed.  Indeed, the truth is that the alternatives have problems of 
their own and do not produce better results. 
In this essay, I will defend the use of partisan elections as a method 
of selecting state court judges.  I will first briefly describe the debate and 
its participants.  Then, I will discuss the competing values that 
supporters and opponents of judicial elections advance.  I will next 
address the arguments for and against judicial elections, showing that, 
while they may not be a perfect method of selecting judges, neither are 
the alternatives. 
At the outset, though, I will briefly describe the ways in which the 
states currently select their judges.  In 1988, Harry Stumpf noted that the 
variety of selection methods constituted a “rather unclear patchwork” of 
selection systems.1
 
* Jack Park is of counsel to Strickland Brockington & Lewis in Atlanta, where he handles 
redistricting, voting rights, and other election law issues.  Park has formerly served as an Army JAG 
Officer, Assistant Attorney General for the State of Alabama, Special Assistant to the Inspector 
General for The Corporation for National and Community Service, and a Visiting Legal Fellow at 
The Heritage Foundation. 
  The primary difference has been, and is, between 
 1. HARRY P. STUMPF, AMERICAN JUDICIAL POLITICS 160 (Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich 
1988); see also id., at 164 (a “hodgepodge” of selection mechanisms”).  Complicating matters, in 
Michigan and Ohio, the political parties nominate candidates for judicial office, but the election is 
conducted on a nonpartisan basis.  See Matthew J. Streb, “The Study of Judicial Elections,” in 
RUNNING FOR JUDGE:  THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL 
ELECTIONS 7 (Streb ed., 2007) [hereinafter RUNNING FOR JUDGE].    
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elective systems (both partisan and nonpartisan) and appointive systems.  
The so-called Missouri plan is emblematic of the majority of the 
appointive plans.  It calls for a commission to nominate three candidates, 
one of whom is then selected by the Governor.  All of the judges so 
appointed stand for a retention election that allows voters to choose 
whether to retain them or not, but does not pit them against another 
named candidate.  For the purposes of this essay, the primary selection 
methods will be partisan elections, nonpartisan elections, and merit, or 
Missouri plan, selection by a commission. 
I.  THE DEBATE 
While complaints about judicial elections have been made for some 
time, the nature of those complaints has changed.  Years ago, judicial 
elections were criticized because they were sleepy contests in which 
challengers did not appear, voters did not participate, and incumbents 
did not lose.  Now, the opponents complain that the opposite is the case; 
challengers appear, incumbents sometimes lose, elections are noisy and 
expensive, and the judiciary is demeaned as a result. 
Judicial elections have powerful opponents.  They include retired 
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, John Grisham, the 
organized bar, mainstream media, George Soros and his Open Society 
Institute, and law professors.  They believe that issue-oriented political 
campaigns, with all of their promises, advertising, and fund raising, lead 
voters to think of judges as politicians, instead of appreciating them as 
disinterested guardians of the law.2
The supporters of judicial elections are less well-known.  Two of 
those supporters describe them as “[m]ostly a small handful of social 
scientists” who “rely primarily on arguments about the value of 
accountability and . . . recognize the inherently political nature of 
judicial decision making.”
  Their proposed solution is the 
replacement of partisan elections with, at the least, non-partisan 
elections and, even better, what many call merit selection plans. 
3
 
 2. Cf. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73-74 (Harvard Univ. Press 1958) (“For 
myself, it would be irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to 
choose them, which I assuredly do not.”). 
  For my part, I support partisan judicial 
elections because I saw how they helped to change the business climate 
 3. CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2 
(2009). 
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of Alabama for the better between 1994 and the present.4  And the court 
did so by applying well-settled law to the cases before it without 
improperly favoring business interests.5
In addition to races for the Senate, U. S. House of Representatives, 
governorships and state legislative positions, the 2010 elections included 
elections for appellate judges in a number of states that gave supporters 
and opponents of judicial elections the opportunity to make their 
arguments.  The Justice at Stake Campaign, an opponent of judicial 
elections, published The New Politics of Judicial Elections 2000-2009:  
Decade of Change in which it pointed to a “pronounced and systemic” 
surge in spending on judicial elections campaigns, particularly by “super 
spenders.”
 
6  In response, the American Justice Partnership published 
Justice Hijacked:  Your Right to Vote is at Stake, in which Colleen Pero 
noted, among other things, the amount of money that George Soros and 
his Open Society Institute has contributed to groups opposing the 
election of judges, including the three organizations that published The 
New Politics.7  Members of the Federalist Society also published white 
papers on the Alabama, Texas, North Carolina, Michigan, Illinois, 
California, and Washington supreme courts.8
Results in the elections varied.  Three justices on the Iowa Supreme 
Court who had joined in an opinion striking down an Iowa law that 
limited civil marriage to a union between a man and a woman, were not 
retained.
 
9
 
 4. See, e.g., Michael DeBow, The Road Back from “Tort Hell”:  The Alabama Supreme 
Court, 1994-2004 (2004), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/the-road-back-
from-tort-hell-the-alabama-supreme-court-1994-2004.  
  A justice on the Illinois Supreme Court who joined in striking 
down tort reform legislation as unconstitutional under the state 
 5. See Jack Park, Alabama Supreme Court:  Role of Court in Key Corporate Cases, (2010) 
available at http://www.fed-soc.org/publications. 
 6. Sample et al., The New Politics of Judicial Elections 2000-2009:  Decade of Change, at 1, 
available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/resources. 
 7. Colleen Pero, Justice Hijacked:  Your Right to Vote is at Stake, (2010), available at 
http://www.americanjusticepartnership.com/hijacked.php.  From a review of the Form 990’s that 
certain federally tax-exempt organizations file with the IRS, the report calculated that, between 
2000 and 2008, the Open Society Institute contributed more than $2.8 million to Justice at Stake, 
$2.225 million to the Brennan Center for Justice, and nearly $1 million to the National Institute for 
Money in State Politics.  Id. at 11.   
 8. See generally, FEDERALIST SOCIETY, http://www.fed-soc.org/publications (last visited 
April 10, 2011).  The views stated in those white papers are those of the authors, not of the 
Federalist Society. 
 9. See, e.g., Grant Schulte, Iowans Dismiss Three Justices, DES MOINES REGISTER, Nov. 3, 
2010, available at 
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/article/20101103/NEWS09/11030390/Iowans-dismiss-three-
justices. 
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constitution was retained.10  Voters in Nevada rejected a proposal to 
adopt a merit selection plan to replace their current system of 
nonpartisan elections.11  That Nevada initiative included recorded calls 
with a message from Justice O’Connor, which she said was not 
authorized, urging voters to vote for the proposed change to merit 
selection.12
II.  THE COMPETING VALUES 
 
Supporters and opponents of judicial elections advance different 
values to support their positions.  Supporters invoke accountability, 
while opponents rely on independence.  The parties tend to talk past 
each other, so it is not only important to understand the competing 
values and their limitations, but also to try to move beyond them by 
considering the evidence that supports the arguments made by each side. 
The authors of a 2000 Federalist Society white paper supporting 
judicial elections explain that too much of either accountability or 
independence is “unattractive.”13  Judges who are too independent may 
do whatever they want, and those who are too accountable may follow 
public opinion polls or political party preferences in their decisions.  The 
authors observe, “Ideally, we want a system that selects judges who 
combine the virtues of independence and accountability in just the right 
amounts, but perfection is an unlikely result of our choice of judicial 
selection mechanism.”14
Accountability means answering for one’s actions or inactions.  
Some suggest that, instead of answering to voters, judges should answer 
to the law, but the law is not self-enforcing.  An appellate court can 
require a lower court to follow the law, but the Supreme Court and, to a 
lesser extent, the supreme courts of the states have the final word on 
constitutional issues.  Accordingly, reliance on judges to police their 
 
 
 10. See, e.g., Ann Knef, “Justice Kilbride Prevails in Costly Ill. Retention Election,” 
LEGALNEWSLINE.COM, Nov. 3, 2010, http://www.legalnewsline.com/news/229640-justice-kilbride-
prevails-in-costly-ill.-retention-election. 
 11. See, e.g., “Nevada Voters Reject Judicial Ballot Measures,” LAS VEGAS SUN, Nov. 3, 
2010, available at http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2010/nov/03/nv-nevada-measures-2nd-ld-
writethru/. 
 12. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, “‘Robo-Calls’ Spark Debate Over Justice O’Connor’s Support for 
Ballot Initiative,” LAW.COM, Oct. 28, 2010, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202474019348&rss=newswire&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1.  
 13. Michael DeBow et al., The Case for Partisan Judicial Elections, at 2, (2003) available at 
http://www.fed-soc.org/publications. 
 14. Id. 
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own fidelity to the law does not provide much in the way of 
accountability. 
Elections are “powerful legitimacy-creating institutions” that 
“create an inextricable link” between the voters and those they elect.15  
Creating that link between judges and the state’s voters is important.  A 
finding that Stephen Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric Posner make supports 
the notion that judicial elections create a link between judges and the 
voters.  They conclude that appellate judges selected through partisan 
judicial elections write more opinions than the judges who are appointed 
to their position, but the appointed judges write opinions that are cited 
more often.16  From this, they go on to write that, while elected judges 
“care about their reputation in the local community of lay voters and 
politicians,” appointed judges are above that and “care about their 
reputation among a national community of like-minded professionals.”17
As Judge William Pryor of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
notes, judicial independence was originally understood to mean 
independence from the other branches of government.
  
Put differently, elected judges know for whom they work and who pays 
their salary.  That knowledge can restrain the kind of judicial activism 
discussed below. 
18  The Framers 
“widely agreed” that the judiciary should be independent of the 
executive and legislative branches and provided for that independence in 
Article III of the Constitution.19  Judge Pryor also explains that the 
Framers “expected the judiciary to be accountable to the people.”20
Independence was also understood to mean “decisional 
independence,” which is a judge’s ability to “decide a case fairly based 
on the facts and the law.”
 
21  The Framers protected this lofty role of the 
federal judges by giving them life tenure and by precluding cuts in their 
pay in the Constitution.22
 
 15. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 3 at 17.   
 
 16. Stephen Choi et al., Professionals or Politicians:  The Uncertain Empirical Case for an 
Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26 JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS, AND ORGANIZATION 
290, 309, 315 (2010) [hereinafter Professionals or Politicians].  
 17. Id. at 292. 
 18.  William H. Pryor, Jr., Not-So-Serious Threats to Judicial Independence, 93 VA. L. REV. 
1759, 1764 (2007). 
 19. Id.  Judge Pryor points to the provisions of § 1 of Article III, which vest the entirety of the 
judicial power in the judiciary, provide tenure for federal judges, and guarantee their compensation.  
Id. 
 20. Id. at 1765.    
 21. Id.  
 22. Id.  
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In the hands of the opponents of judicial elections, though, 
independence is often invoked to support immunity from public 
pressure, the ability to make unpopular decisions without fearing 
negative political consequences.  Pitched this way, independence makes 
a virtue out of a court’s rejecting the views of the legislature or the 
perceived majority view of the community.  
Law school classes in constitutional law discuss the “counter-
majoritarian difficulty.”  Rather than being a badge of honor, the 
judiciary’s thwarting of the will of the legislature is a fundamental point 
of tension.  Alexander Bickel explained: 
[N]othing can finally depreciate the central function that is assigned  
in democratic theory and practice to the electoral process; nor can it  
be denied that the policy-making power of representative institutions, 
born of the electoral process, is the distinguishing characteristic of the 
system.  Judicial review works counter to this characteristic.23
The more frequently courts indulge their power to trump the 
legislative process, the greater the tension.  As with steam, the greater 
the tension, the greater will be the need for an outlet, which elections can 
provide. 
 
Elections may be “blunt instruments of accountability,” but they are 
also “effective in maintaining popular control over the outer limits of 
governmental decision-making.”24
III.  THE ARGUMENTS 
  When courts find the right to same-
sex marriage, recover unlimited amounts of noneconomic damages, or to 
more funding for some school systems, as they have done, those courts 
push the outer limits of governmental decision-making.  Voters do not 
act inappropriately in voting against appellate judges who act like 
legislators.         
A. The Political Cannot Be Depoliticized 
Those who oppose an elected judiciary contend that the alternative 
merit selection method is less political than elections.  There are two 
problems with this objection.  First, judicial selection is a political 
 
 23. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 19 (1962). 
 24. STUMPF, supra note 1 (quoting PHILIP L. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH:  JUDICIAL 
ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 238-39 (1980)); see also BONNEAU & HALL, 
supra note 3, at 14 (“Justices who are elected . . . have a strong incentive to consider constituency 
preferences on those few issues that are publicly salient and politically visible.”). 
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process, no matter how it is done.  Second, when state appellate courts 
behave like legislators, try to solve social problems, or flout the will of 
the majority, they do political work.  And, when they do political work, 
it is appropriate to hold them politically accountable. 
1.  Judicial Selection is a Political Process 
Federal judicial selection is tantamount to anointment, but politics 
plays a major role.  Candidates for a federal judicial position resemble 
nothing so much as a group of people running around in a thunderstorm 
each holding up an umbrella hoping that he or she will be the one struck 
by lightning.  Those candidates must be of the right political party and 
obtain the approval of State Senators to be nominated.  The nominees 
must also appear before the Senate Judiciary Committee to defend their 
qualifications, and, if they are lucky, their nomination is debated on the 
floor of the Senate.  Nominations like those of Robert Bork and Justice 
Clarence Thomas, among others, evidence that the federal process 
involves a big dose of politics. 
Political considerations do not disappear when merit selection plans 
are used; those considerations just move behind the closed door of the 
selection process.  There, the members of the merit selection 
commissions have to curry favor with the various factions of the bar.25  
For example, lawyers control 16 of the 17 seats on the commission that 
is responsible for selecting appellate judges in Maryland and 15 of the 
17 seats on Tennessee’s Judicial Nominating Commission, even though 
that state legislature cut the number of lawyer seats to 10 in 2009.26  
Elsewhere, lawyers are generally well represented.  Nobody should be 
surprised if they tend to favor the candidates they deem most likely to 
“protect[] and expand[] the domain of law and lawyers and thus raise[] 
lawyers’ incomes and influence.”27
Moreover, the appointment process is not free from the influence of 
politics.  When Republican Governor Chris Christie of New Jersey 
decided not to re-appoint Justice John Wallace to the New Jersey 
 
 
 25. See Bryan T. Fitzpatrick, The Politics of Merit Selection, 74 MO. L. REV. 675 (2009); 
Stephen J. Ware, The Missouri Plan in National Perspective, 74 MO. L. REV. 751 (2009). 
 26. Pero, supra note 7, at 13. 
 27. Michael DeBow, The Bench, The Bar, and Everyone Else:  Some Questions About State 
Judicial Selection, 74 MO. L. REV. 777, 779.  See also id. at 779 n.10 (quoting F. Andrew Hanssen, 
On the Politics of Judicial Selection:  Lawyers and State Campaigns for the Merit Plan, 110 PUB. 
CHOICE 79, 80 (2002)) (“One economic study of lawyer support for merit selection found that ‘the 
merit plan is associated with between eighteen and thirty-two percent more filings in state supreme 
courts over the period 1985 through 1994.’”). 
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Supreme Court, he said that his action was not a reflection on Wallace, 
but, rather, on the court, which had a “history of using legal precedent to 
set social and tax policies—a role which belongs squarely with the 
Legislative and Executive branches of state government.”28  Governor 
Christie nominated Anne Patterson instead, but the Democratic President 
of the New Jersey Senate declined to hold hearings on the nomination.29
In Missouri, after Missouri Supreme Court Justice Ronnie White 
retired, Governor Matt Blunt, who campaigned against a runaway 
judiciary, criticized the judicial nominating commission process and the 
candidates they submitted.  Instead of respecting the fact that Governor 
Blunt had been elected with a majority of the votes, the panel sent him 
“three well-credentialed, business-as-usual, ‘there is no problem with the 
Supreme Court of Missouri’ candidates.”
 
30  Some suggested that 
Governor Blunt reject all three candidates, but, under the Missouri 
procedure, that would have left the decision to the commission.31  
Governor Blunt held his nose and appointed one of the candidates.32
Finally, with respect to the “officially nonpartisan” judicial election 
for a seat on the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 2008, “progressives” and 
the teachers union supported Louis Butler, the incumbent who was 
defeated, while business and law enforcement interests supported the 
challenger, Michael Gableman.
 
33  Something similar apparently 
happened in the race between David Prosser and JoAnne Kloppenburg.34
 
  
The nonpartisan label, thus, has not blinded the interests or the voters. 
 
 28. See Press Release, Governor Chris Christie, Governor Chris Christie Announces 
Appointment to the New Jersey Supreme Court (May 3, 2010). 
 29. See generally Kevin Mooney, Supreme Confidence, THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR (Feb. 15, 
2011), available at http://www.spectator.org. 
 30. Clifford W. Taylor, Without Merit:  Why “Merit” Selection Is the Wrong Way for States 
to Choose Judges, at 4 (Oct. 6, 2010), available at http://www.heritage.org. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See id.  As Taylor noted, Governor Blount was “the only person in the process who had 
any claim to having presented his ideas on who should serve as justices to the people of Missouri 
 . . . was blocked in a transparently political move that compelled his selection of the least 
disagreeable candidate.  Id. 
 33. See, e.g., Patrick Marley & Stacy Foster, Gableman victorious:  Challenger Beats Butler 
in High Court Race; 1st Such Ouster Since ’67, WISCONSIN JOURNAL-SENTINEL (Apr. 2, 2008), 
available at http://www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/29406414.html.  President Obama has 
nominated Butler for a federal district court judgeship.  See Jack Park, Look Out for “Loophole 
Louie”, Dec. 3, 2009, http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=34653. 
 34. See, e.g., Robert Costa, Dem Rep:  Prosser Equals Walker, Prosser Equals Koch, 
NATIONAL REVIEW, Apr. 3, 2011, available at http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/263750/dem-
rep-prosser-equals-walker-prosser-equals-koch-robert-costa. 
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2.  The Decisions of State Supreme Courts Have Political 
Consequences 
Is it wrong to seek to hold judges accountable?  Some of those 
opposed to judicial elections reason that judges are not like legislators 
because they do not make political decisions.  That argument fails 
because judges make decisions that have important political and public 
policy consequences.  State courts have interpreted their state 
constitutions to mandate the recognition of same-sex marriage.35  Other 
judicial rulings have overturned legislative tort reform measures such as 
laws capping the recovery of noneconomic damages on the ground that 
they violated state constitutions.36
Rulings like these raise important questions regarding the proper 
role of the judiciary and judicial philosophy.  Lawsuits challenging the 
constitutionality of state systems of financing public education, for 
example, constitute “a quintessential example of judicial activism—the 
least accountable branch of state government overrules the highly visible 
public policies set by state and local legislative bodies, and uses 
relatively novel legal precedent.”
 
37  The ruling in New Jersey that 
mandated a new system of financing public education, for example, was 
based on a provision calling for a “thorough and efficient” system of 
public education.38  Such rulings produce judicial second-guessing of the 
legislature’s efforts to comply with the court’s ruling; what the 
legislature provides rarely satisfies the prevailing plaintiffs.39
 
 35. See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W. 2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Kerrigan v. Commissioner of 
Public Health, 957 A. 2d 407 (Conn. 2008); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).  Michael DeBow observes, 
“Litigation over same-sex marriage, typically centered on the equal protection provisions of state 
constitutions, is probably the most visible example of this phenomenon [i.e., the “counter-
majoritarian difficulty”] at the present time.”  DeBow, supra note 27, at 780 n.12. 
  The result 
is unsightly fights between the legislature, which has the responsibility 
 36. See, e.g., American Oculoplastic Surgery v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. 2010) 
(statutory cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases violates State constitution’s 
right to trial by jury); Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 930 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 2010); Best v. 
Taylor Machine Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997) (statutory cap on noneconomic damages 
violates state constitutional bar on special legislation and separation of powers provision); Wright v. 
Central DuPage Hospital Assn., 347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976). 
 37. Karen Swenson, School Finance Reform Litigation:  Why Are Some State Courts Activist 
and Others Are Restrained?, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1147, 1149-50 (2000). 
 38.  See N.J. Const. art. VIII, §4. 
 39. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York, 861 N.E.2d 50 (N.Y. 2006) 
(rejecting contention of New York City that additional $1.93 billion in funding is insufficient; New 
York City sought an additional $5.53 billion). 
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to allocate funding to all state functions, and the judiciary, which has 
mandated additional funding for public education. 
The Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision in Kerrigan v. 
Commissioner of Public Health 40 isolates an important question of 
judicial philosophy.  In holding that a Connecticut civil union law that 
defined marriage as the union between one man and one woman 
discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation, the court gave voice to 
the living constitution rationale.  The court wrote that the state’s 
constitution “was meant to be, and is, a living document with current 
effectiveness . . . [i]t is an instrument of progress . . . and should not be 
interpreted too narrowly or too literally so that it fails to have 
contemporary effectiveness for all of our citizens.”41  As for marriage, 
the court stated that “our conventional understanding of marriage must 
yield to a more contemporary appreciation of the rights entitled to 
constitutional protection.”42
If the drafters of the Connecticut Constitution had same-sex 
marriage in mind when they did their work, the court would not have 
had to invoke the “living constitution” in all its glory.  The court had to 
find that right somewhere other than in the law.  The court also had to 
bypass the amendment process in the state constitution, taking on itself 
the burden of making the state “yield to a more contemporary 
appreciation of the rights entitled to constitutional protection.”
 
43  As 
Robert Bork has warned, when a court “decides it is the instrument of 
the general will and keeper of the [public] conscience,” there is no 
longer any law, just “the moral imperatives and self-righteousness of the 
hour.”44
The Iowa Supreme Court’s 2009 ruling in Varnum v. Brien, holding 
that a state statute limiting civil marriage to a union between a man and a 
woman violates the equal protection clause of the Iowa Constitution, 
raised similarly important questions of judicial philosophy.
 
45  As with 
the Connecticut Constitution, the drafters of the 1858 Iowa Constitution 
did not have same-sex marriage in mind when they drafted that clause.  
The voters of Iowa had a remedy, however, in retention elections, and 
they used it to remove the three justices who were up for retention.46
 
 40. 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008). 
 
 41. Id. at 420-21 (citations omitted). 
 42. Id. at 482. 
 43. Id. 
 44. ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:  THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 
132 (1990). 
 45. 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
 46. See Schulte, supra note 9.  
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Separate and apart from decisions with important political 
consequences, the state courts have an effect on the state’s business 
climate.  The Alabama Supreme Court of the late 1980’s and early 
1990’s was identified in the minds of many with a litigation climate that 
was hostile to corporate defendants.  One example is the court’s decision 
in BMW of North America v. Gore,47 in which the court ordered BMW 
to pay punitive damages of $2 million because the company touched up 
the paint job on the vehicle it sold without disclosing the repair, a 
punitive to compensatory damages ratio of 500-1.  In another decision, 
the court struck down a statutory cap on punitive damages on the ground 
that the cap violated the state constitution’s guarantee of a right to a jury 
trial.48  The court also adopted a plaintiff-friendly “justifiable reliance” 
standard for fraud actions and applied it to both consumer and 
commercial transactions.49
Elections helped to change that court, and Alabama has reaped the 
benefit of that change.  The declaration by Republican candidates that 
they saw that the role of the judiciary is to say what the law is, not what 
it ought to be, resonated with the voters.  In subsequent elections, 
Democratic candidates made the same declaration, but the Republican 
incumbents have proven trustworthy.  Since the change in the court’s 
personnel, multinational businesses like Mercedes, Honda, Hyundai, and 
Thyssen-Krupp have built plants in the state, providing employment 
opportunities to many residents. 
  The combination of the relaxed standard for 
proving reliance in fraud cases and the absence of a cap on punitive 
damages contributed to the state’s reputation as a “tort hell.”  
 
 47. 646 So.2d 619 (Ala. 1994), rev’d 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996). 
 48. Henderson v. Ala. Power Co., 627 So.2d 878 (Ala. 1993). 
 49. Johnson v. State Farm Ins. Co., 587 So.2d 974, 979 (Ala. 1991).  In 1997, the court 
observed that the adoption of the justifiable reliance standard had been a mistake and returned to the 
reasonable reliance standard that had previously been in use.  See Foremost Ins. v. Parham, 693 
So.2d 409 (Ala. 1997).  Significantly, Justice Shores agreed with the decision to return to the 
reasonable reliance standard.  She wrote, “In my opinion, this Court made a mistake in departing 
from a standard in fraud cases that had worked well.  As a member of the majority that made that 
departure, I am willing to admit that the rule should not have been changed.”  Id. at 437 (Shores, J., 
concurring specially). 
  The difference between the two standards can be seen in a common scenario from that 
time period.  The purchaser of a mobile home claims that he was defrauded by the seller’s agent 
who told him something that was inconsistent with the plain terms of the written contract the 
plaintiff signed.  Under the justifiable reliance standard, the buyer might claim that he relied on 
what he was told and might reach the jury on that claim.  Under the reasonable reliance standard, 
the plain terms of the contract would be more likely to control. 
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B. The Practice of Judicial Elections 
 The opponents of judicial elections complain that elections 
demean the judiciary because the need to raise campaign funds, the 
related advertising, and the campaigning put the judiciary in a bad light.  
Critics view voters as uninterested and question the qualifications of 
candidates.  In this portion of the essay, I will address those complaints.  
1.  Money 
Any focus on spending in judicial election campaigns needs to be 
put in perspective.  A good place to start is here: “[M]oney is a 
necessary but insufficient condition for electoral success,”50 and 
electoral success is what candidates are after.  In addition, by 
comparison to other spending, spending on political campaigns is not 
significant.  As George Will noted last October, the anticipated total 
spending by all parties, campaigns, and issue-advocacy groups on all 
political offices in the two-year cycle between 2008 and 2010 was 
expected to be $4.2 billion, less than what Procter & Gamble spent on 
advertising in one year ($8.6 billion) and less than what Americans 
spend on potato chips in a year ($7.1 billion).51  Appointive systems are 
not free of spending.  Approximately $3.7 million was spent to influence 
the confirmations of Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justice 
Samuel Alito for their Supreme Court positions.52
In addition, judicial campaigns are typically down-ticket races.  
They typically appear on the ballot below races for Congress, Governor, 
and other statewide officials.  Candidates must spend money in order to 
generate name recognition and encourage voters to look beyond those 
higher-profile races.  Bonneau and Hall observe that candidates for state 
supreme court positions cannot generate “free” publicity like candidates 
for other offices can.
  Given those figures, 
it is difficult to say that too much is spent on any one race. 
53
 
 50. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 3, at 76. 
  For example, many incumbent officials issue 
press releases, and members of Congress have the benefit of the franking 
privilege. 
 51. George Will, Return of the Scold War, THE WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2010, at A21.  Will also 
noted that the $4.2 billion expectation was about what Americans spend on yogurt in a year, but less 
than what they spend on Halloween candy in two years.  Id. 
 52. Deborah Goldberg, Interest Group Participation in Judicial Elections, in RUNNING FOR 
JUDGE, supra note 1, at 90. 
 53.  BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 3 at 77. 
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In this connection, it is important to note the role that political 
parties play.  Bonneau and Hall note that political parties are “powerful 
organizational actor[s]” which have experience in raising funds and 
running campaigns.54  Voters can also rely on the party’s imprimatur.  
Baum and Klein suggest that, when voters rely on the party’s 
imprimatur, they may not be basing their voting decision on information 
about the candidate’s performance, with the result that accountability is 
blurred.55
 The Justice at Stake Campaign sounds the alarm about the 
amount of spending in judicial campaigns and the fact that much of it is 
done by “super spenders.”
  That suggestion is problematic given that there is good reason 
to believe that Democrat lawyers think differently from Republican 
lawyers.  Moreover, the candidate who has won a primary election has 
not only earned the right to the imprimatur, but also has been vetted to a 
degree by the party and the voters. 
56  Bonneau and Hall make some findings that 
put the alarm in its place.  From their review of elections between 1990 
and 2004, they conclude that nonpartisan elections “significantly raise 
the costs of seeking office,” and that incumbents tend to outspend 
challengers.57  The alarm also fails to reflect some of the reasons for 
spending.  Justice at Stake points at the 2008 Alabama race between 
Greg Shaw, a judge of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, and 
Deborah Bell Paseur, a state court trial judge. However, that race 
involved an open seat on the Alabama Supreme Court, which was the 
only seat up for election in 2008.58
2.  Voter Knowledge 
  By failing to consider the context for 
spending, Justice at Stake overstates its case. 
The contention that voters lack interest in judicial elections and 
knowledge sufficient to judge the qualifications of the candidates has 
problems as well.  At the outset, it smacks of elitism, in that voters are 
deemed competent to vote for other elected officials, but not for judges.  
 
 54. Id. at  60. 
 55. Laurence Baum & David Klein, Voter Responses to High-Visibility Judicial Campaigns, 
in RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 1, at 142. 
 56. Sample et al., supra note 6. 
 57. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 3, at 49, 71. 
 58. See, e.g., Greg Shaw Narrowly Wins Alabama Supreme Court Post, THE BIRMINGHAM 
NEWS (Nov. 5, 2008, 9:21 AM), 
http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2008/11/greg_shaw_narrowly_wins_alabam.html.  See also Eric 
Velasco, Spending Down in Alabama Supreme Court race,  THE BIRMINGHAM NEWS (Feb. 1, 2011, 
8:00 AM) http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2011/02/spending_down_in_alabama_supre.html (noting that 
spending for those same seats in 2004 was $7.7 million, but only $4.3 million in 2010). 
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As former Chief Justice of the Michigan Supreme Court Cliff Taylor 
puts it, the notion that as “well-intentioned as [voters] are, they are just 
unable to evaluate judges because judges’ work is very sophisticated and 
common folks don’t have the learning to appreciate it” sounds 
“plausible,” but it does not bear up when examined closely.59
One way of measuring voter interest is by looking at the 
phenomenon of roll-off in elections.  Some voters vote only for the 
offices they consider to be the most important and do not vote in the 
other races on the ballot.  For example, in presidential election years, 
many voters vote only for a presidential candidate and ignore the other 
races.  As Bonneau and Hall put it, “Presidential elections encourage 
‘casual’ voters to participate, and these people are not likely to vote for 
‘insignificant’ races, such as state supreme court.”
 
60  When they looked 
at ballot roll-off in state supreme court elections between 1990 and 2004, 
Bonneau and Hall found that “higher amounts of campaign spending 
produce significantly lower levels of roll-off.”61  Baum and Klein found 
the same thing when they looked at voter participation in the 1998 and 
2002 elections in Ohio, both of which included state supreme court 
positions on the ballot.62
Bonneau and Hall also see voters and candidates as rational actors.  
Candidates act rationally:  “Challengers go after incumbents who are the 
most electorally vulnerable, either because they hold marginal seats or 
because they suffer an attenuated incumbency advantage by virtue of 
never having been elected.”
 
63
 
 59. Taylor, supra note 30, at 2. 
  Incumbents are electorally vulnerable 
when they win by a small margin in their last election or when they are 
appointed to fill a vacancy.  The latter enjoy the benefit of incumbency 
without having been elected and lack campaign experience.  We should 
not be surprised when candidates decide to challenge vulnerable 
incumbents and spend money to educate voters. 
 60. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 3, at 44. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Baum & Klein, supra note 55, at 150 (“The enormous difference in the volume of 
information from the campaigns and the news media had a very substantial effect on voters’ 
participation in the [2002] supreme court races.”). 
 63. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 3, at 96; see also id. (“[T]he likelihood of challengers 
entering state supreme court elections is predictable and reflects, at least to some extent, strategic 
thinking about the probability of winning.”). 
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3.  Quality of Candidates and Judges 
The evidence does not support the contention that merit selection 
mechanisms produce better judges.  At least two studies show that 
appellate judges tend to have comparable qualifications without regard 
for the way in which they were selected.64  Bonneau and Hall also 
conclude that voters can distinguish among candidates by their 
qualifications, favoring challengers with judicial experience over those 
without it.65
 Other scholars have found that “[e]lected judges write more 
opinions”
  In other words, voters tend to like candidates whose first 
name is “Judge.” 
66 than appointed judges and that even though the opinions of 
appointed judges are cited more frequently, “the evidence suggests that 
the large quantity difference makes up for the small quality difference.67  
This suggests that voters may view productivity as one measure of 
judicial competence.68  Voters may also view productivity as a sign that 
the judge is doing his or her job.  In the 2010 elections in Alabama, 
Associate Justice Tom Parker had to respond to suggestions that he was 
significantly behind in his work.69
4.  The Alternatives Revisited 
  Finally, as noted above, the 
difference may reflect who the judge thinks he or she works for.  Elected 
judges think they work for the voters, while appointed, merit-selection 
judges look for the respect of the larger legal community. 
Opponents of elections contend that merit selection plans and 
retention elections are preferable to partisan elections for a variety of 
 
 64. See Henry R. Glick & Craig F. Emmert, Selection Systems and Judicial Characteristics:  
The Recruitment of State Supreme Court Judges, in JUDICATURE 228-35 (Dec.-Jan. 1987);  
BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 3, at 136 (“[D]iversity on the bench is not affected by the particular 
methods of for staffing the bench.”) (citing Mark S. Hurwitz and Drew Lanier Noble, Explaining 
Judicial Diversity:  The Differential Ability of Women and Minorities to Attain Seats on Supreme 
Courts and Appellate Courts, 3 STATE POLITICS AND POLICY QUARTERLY 329-352 (2003)).   
 65. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 3, at 101 (“[T]he electorate not only responds to basic 
differences between challengers, but also appears to differentiate between types of judicial 
experience” and “the electorate takes into account judicial experience when selecting among 
candidates.”). 
 66. Choi et al., supra note 16, at 290. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 312. 
 69. See, e.g., Chris Anthony, Parsons:  Tom Parker is the Least Productive Justice, OPELIKA-
AUBURN NEWS,  
Available at http://bamafactcheck.com/view/full_story_opelika/9756080/article-Parsons--Tom-
Parker-is-the-least-productive-justice-on-the-Alabama-Supreme-Court-Truth-Rating--5-out-of-5-
?instance=special; see also Choi et al., supra note 16, at 312.  
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reasons.  Without conceding that the opponents are correct, the political 
implications of merit selection should be closely examined. 
Michael DeBow notes that ideology and the self-interest of lawyers 
are good reasons to be concerned about the extent of lawyer influence on 
the nominating commissions in non-election states.70  With respect to 
ideology, Brian Fitzpatrick collected data on the appellate court 
nominees in Tennessee and Missouri, both so-called merit selection 
states.  He determined that, in Tennessee, 67% of the nominees voted 
more often in Democratic primaries and 33% voted more often in 
Republican primaries.71
Of the fifty-four nominees in Missouri since 1995 who made any 
campaign contributions, 87% gave more to Democrats than 
Republicans, and only 13% gave more to Republicans than Democrats. 
Over the same time period, Democratic candidates in Missouri only 
received roughly 50% of the general election votes in state and federal 
House races. . . . It should be noted that the disparity in the amount of 
money these nominees contributed is even more stark than the 
disparity in the number of nominees who contributed:  nearly 93% 
($316,010) of all of the money contributed went to Democratic 
candidates, whereas only 7% ($24, 615) went to Republicans.
  As for Missouri, Fitzpatrick’s conclusions are 
striking: 
72
Those results correlate with the general belief that, as a group, 
lawyers “are, on average, more liberal (in the contemporary political 
sense—i.e., associated more closely with policy positions held by the 
Democratic Party) than are members of the general public.”
 
73  As for 
their self-interest, DeBow observes that, as a group, lawyers “have an 
obvious personal interest in the level of lawyer incomes, which in turn is 
a function of the importance of law in American society.”74
 
  We should 
not be surprised if the interests of lawyers are reflected in the 
recommendations that lawyer members of nominating commissions 
make.  This is even more the case if, as Cliff Taylor points out, all of the 
applicants will have good records.  In that light,  
 
 70. DeBow, The Bench, the Bar, and Everyone Else, supra note 27, at 778. 
 71. Brian Fitzpatrick, The Politics of Merit Selection, 74 Mo. L. Rev. 675, 693 (reviewing 
voting records for 88 of 90 nominees). 
 72. Id. at 696-97 (emphasis added) (finding 54 of 108 nominees to have made political 
contributions). 
 73. Id. at 676. 
 74. DeBow, supra note 27, at 779. 
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it quickly becomes clear that it is reckless to say that because one 
applicant, many years ago, had a 3.5 GPA and another a 3.6 GPA at 
different law schools, or that, later in life, one was a Boy Scout leader 
and the other a food bank volunteer, one is “merit qualified” and the 
other isn’t.75
Merit selection will inevitably boil down to consideration of something 
other than “merit.” 
   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
At twenty year intervals, merit selection has been reviewed and 
found wanting.  In 1969, Richard Watson and Ronald Downing 
published a comprehensive study of the origins and operation of the 
Missouri Plan.  They found that the lawyer members of the nominating 
commissions tended to look at candidates in the light of their practices 
and clients.  The effect was to replace electoral politics with a 
“somewhat subterranean process of bar and bench politics, in which 
there is little popular control.”76  Some twenty years later, Harry Stumpf 
wrote, “If the lay, the professional, and even the political inputs built 
into the Missouri Plan do not work as advertised, and if the plan in 
general cannot be shown to produce superior judges, what is left of the 
argument?  The answer is, not much.”77
No system of judicial selection is perfect, but elections provide a 
means of holding judges accountable when they push the outer limits of 
governmental decision-making.  We can use lawyers to select our 
judges, or we can let the voters do it.  For me, I’ll take the voters.
  In 2007, Bonneau and Hall 
reviewed the results of state court judicial elections from 1990-2004 and 
considered the objections to judicial elections in the light of that review.  
Once again, Bonneau and Hall found that merit selection did not prove 
better in practice than judicial elections. 
78
 
 75. Taylor, supra note 30 at 3. 
 
 76.  See id. at 3-4; see also STUMPF, supra note 1, at 167. 
 77. STUMPF, supra note 1, at 171. 
 78. Cf. Matthew J. Streb & Brian Frederick, Judicial Reform and the Future of Judicial 
Elections, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 1, at 205-06 (noting “deep voter suspicion” of 
attempts to have them surrender their right to vote for judges).  
